Wednesday, May 12, 2010
IASB Restricts Gains form "Own Credit" Changes
The liability treatment follows asset treatment—for example if a company thought that a debt was uncollectible, it would write the debt down to what it thought it would recover. So that the principle of fair value is maintained across the balance sheet, the same theory applies to liabilities.
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has proposed changing the way banks measure their liabilities so they can no longer book the gain noted above and confuse investors after a ratings downgrade.
The IASB acknowledged that there are theoretical arguments for treating financial assets and liabilities in the same way, it is hard to defend the accounting as providing useful information when a company suffering deterioration in credit quality is able to book a corresponding gain.
The "counter intuitive" rule angered policymakers during the financial crisis when profits were being booked by banks despite ratings downgrades"
The proposal is part of an overall revamp of the IASB's fair value or marking to market rule which will be finalized by the end of this year but it is unclear when it comes into force.
HSBC Europe's biggest bank, recently reported that It had both a $5 billion hit from bad debts on U.S. home loans and asset writedowns while at the same time recording a fair value gain of $2.7 billion on its own debt during the period due to a widening in credit spreads.
Earlier in May, UBS recorded a gain of 2.1 billion Swiss francs ($2 billion) due to the widening of its own credit spread.
The debate about whether banks should allow for fair value gains on liabilities is not new, but has assumed fresh importance after a hugely volatile first quarter in credit markets, which saw bank debt trading at a discount in some cases to non-financial bonds.
Some analysts argue that if banks are taking mark-to-market losses on their assets and on hedging instruments, they should also be allowed to account for gains on their liabilities even if the underlying credit quality has not changed.
One of the practical problems with the theoretical approach noted above , however, is that a bank is unlikely to repay the debt early. A bank would usually wait until the debt matures and then buy it back at par.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Accountants to Politicians, Bankers: Hands Off Accounting Standards
The accounting and auditing organizations are worried about proposed legislation setting up a systemic risk regulator for the financial sector. The legislation proposes creation of an oversight council that would have the ability to change accounting standards in the event of a crisis—replacing the FASB as SEC’s acconting standard-setter.
The Centre for Audit Quality states that standards are for the benefit of investors so that they can get the information that they need so that they can make valid investment decisions, and that the SEC acts as an investor advocate and is the right oversight party for helping the FASB maintain independent standard setting. Having financial and banking regulators be part of that process with veto power over accounting and auditing standards is not a good model. Particularly in this time of financial crisis, it is a bit ironic that we would be talking about watering down the process that’s designed to protect investors.”
AICPA president and CEO Barry Melancon noted that banking regulators already have the ability to adjust capital requirements and the SEC can suspend accounting rules when needed, as the SEC has the ability to suspend accounting rules, even without a crisis situation. Accountants fear a circumvention of the rule of due process in the accounting standard-setting process.
The legislation would go against SEC chair Mary Schapiro’s recent warning against interfering with the independence of the accounting standard-setting process, which seh referred to as “race for the bottom”.
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Accounting Rules Mess Up Lending Market
No new credit card securities have been issued since the beginning of October. Such securities are created when card loans are packaged into bonds and sold to investors.
The new rules (FAS 166 and 167) require banks issuing the securities to account for them as if they were on their balance sheets. Previous treatment allowed off-balance sheet treatment for the securities.
On-balance sheet treatment gives federal regulators the right to claim those assets should the institution file for bankruptcy, effectively diminishing bondholders' claim to the assets.
On-balance sheet treatment also may increase banks’ capital requirements.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. plans to discuss the issue at a board meeting Thursday and may make a ruling that clears up the confusion. The rule takes effect on the date companies begin their 2010 fiscal years.
From the start of the year until October, issuers had sold an average of about $3.5 billion worth of credit-card deals each month.
Under the old accounting standard, card issuers -- such as Citigroup, Bank of America, American Express, Capital One, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Discover packaged up pools of credit-card loans and sold them to investors.
Citigroup' said on Friday that the result should be an addition of about $154 billion to its assets, based on Sept. 30 figures.
If the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp does not change the rules regarding how it treats debt from these securities when a bank collapses, rating agencies may downgrade the securitized debt. The debt may not be rated triple-A securities.
The new debt could potentially be rated no higher than Citigroup's own ratings. That would likely lift the bank's borrowing costs when funding new credit card loans or other debt.
Until the accounting rule was changed, these securities didn't have to be included on the banks' balance sheets, so they weren't subject to the same accounting standards and disclosures required for on-balance-sheet items.
Critics of the old treatment argued this rule allowed companies to hide risky assets in these off-balance-sheet items. The new rule will force card issuers to bring off-the-book credit-card loans onto their balance sheets and set aside additional reserves to account for potential losses in these securities.
No new credit-card-backed bonds have emerged in the market since Bank of America issued a $300 million deal on Oct. 2.
Year-to-date issuance of securities made up of credit-card loans has fallen 41% to $32.3 billion from $55.2 billion a year ago, according to a Deutsche Bank note published Nov. 5.
The FDIC could issue guidelines Thursday on the accounting-rule change, which will include the grandfathering of existing credit-card securities so as to minimize the disruption caused to the issuance of such deals.
Friday, July 10, 2009
FASB Beats Up the Banks
QSPEs allow banks and other financial institutions and companies to hold asset-based securities off-balance sheet. This move will not likely have a significant impact on earnings in the banking sector, but it will affect capital levels at institutions that sold mortgage and other loans into such securities.
The previously off-balance sheet assets will now show up on the balance sheet at the start of 2010 for most institutions.
While there may be minimal differences in banks' earnings, the impacts on balance sheets will be more significant, possibly requiring banks to increase reserves.
Banks were initially upset by the timing of the initial proposal, which was put off after objections from the American bankers’ Association. The FASB says ABA lobbying will not change the current implementation date.
The ABA continues to lobby for changes to FASB's mark-to-market accounting rules and other than temporary impairment rules. The banks feel that mark-to-market accounting is not the best measurement for many transactions, advocating that the current approach works for assets expected to be sold, but not for assets that are expected to be held, among other issues. Banks have claimed for years that mark-to-market rules force them to place unrealistically low values on illiquid or otherwise difficult to trade assets (known in mark-to-market accounting terms as "Level 3 Financial Instruments".)
Mark-to-market accounting is under increasingly fierce attack by bankers who are lobbying hard for U.S. Congress to suspend or repeal mark to market rules. Bankers blame the rules for the current financial crisis.
Recently the FASB issued changes to accounting rules that would allow looser mark to market accounting. The changes has sparked opposition to the changes from consumer and investor groups that who are advancing their previously expressed arguments that the rules give management (banks?) too much freedom in valuing assets in distressed or illiquid markets.
Opposition comes from such places as the Consumer Federation of America, the CFA Institute and the FASB's Investors Technical Advisory Committee. The opposition may also have an impact on proposed changes to financial institutions' regulatory capital levels, which the banks claim are needed to ease the existing credit crunch and to avoid future credit messes like we have had in the past year.
Thursday, April 9, 2009
S&P: Mark to Market Rule Changes Don’t Help Banks
S&P said that its ratings of banks won’t change, in spite of the rule changes. U.S. banks lobbied heavily in favour of the new rules.
Related comments by S&P:
- "In our view, the revised fair-value measurement standard provides more flexibility in how banks and other financial institutions will value financial assets,"
- "when market observations are substantially lacking or are meaningfully influenced by temporary supply-and-demand imbalances or market disruptions." This "should be accompanied by relevant financial statement disclosures."
- the key indicator to watch in the upcoming round of quarterly filings from large complex banks will be expansions in the valuation of level 3, or illiquid assets
- They are in favor of the increased transparency of credit losses the “other than temporary impairment losses” rules bring, but that they could result in “reliability issues related to a company’s ability to bifurcate losses into credit and noncredit components because the credit impairment amounts may be difficult to decipher in isolation.”
- Fair value measurement changes will result in increased analysis in evaluating significant adjustments companies make to observable market prices and related assumptions and judgements they apply.
- “This shift [to assets being valued using level 3] ... is a move toward greater use of internally derived measures," Determination of whether a market is active or not will be based on "the highly subjective judgement of each company."
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
WSJ Says Banks Making Bogus Claims about Mark-to-Market
Plenty of banks have succumbed to the credit crunch. Now, accounting rules look set to join the list of casualties.
Accounting rule makers will vote Thursday on proposals to soften "mark-to-market" accounting, the controversial rules requiring companies to peg their investments' value to the market's ups and downs. Many banks blame the rules for worsening their current problems, by locking in losses that they say are merely temporary.
The banks' claims are largely bogus -- after all, no accounting rule forced them to create and invest in the toxic securities that helped cause this crisis. But the Financial Accounting Standards Board is being pressured to water down the rule.
And one of the proposals that the board will vote on Thursday, to relax the standards under which companies must take impairment charges on their "available-for-sale" investments, would be particularly worrying for investors.
Companies record declines in their value of these securities as "unrealized" losses that get assessed on the balance sheet but don't affect earnings or regulatory-capital levels.
If the losses are later determined to be "other than temporary," however, companies must take impairment charges that lower net income and regulatory capital.
FASB's proposal makes it much less likely that stressed banks would take those charges in a timely fashion. Under the plan, all banks would have to do is say they don't intend to sell an "available-for-sale" investment that has incurred mark-to-market losses and probably won't be forced to sell before it recovers. Then, only "credit losses," the amount a company expects to lose if it holds an investment to maturity, would have to be recognized in earnings. The other declines in market value would only go onto the balance sheet, as now.
That could be very important for some banks where toxic securities, with serious mark-to-market losses, comprise a big part of the capital structure. The unrealized losses on "available-for-sale" securities in effect for at least a year are equivalent to 6.6% of risk-weighted capital at U.S. Bancorp and 3.2% at Wells Fargo. That is another reason why investors should focus on tangible common equity as a capital measure instead, which does include such unrealized losses.
A rule change would be good for the banks -- not good for investors who need accurate valuations of companies' assets, reported clearly, on which to base their investment decisions. In fact, making things easier on the banks may only make already-cynical investors even more suspicious of the numbers that the banks are reporting.
This is happening now because of pressure on FASB Chairman Robert Herz from politicians who, at a recent hearing, threatened to eviscerate fair-value accounting if the changes didn't happen. So it isn't just the fair-value rules that are at stake here -- it is FASB's independence in setting all accounting rules. The risk is that plans to water down mark-to-market rules are only the start.
By Michael Rapoport at the Wall Street Journal.
Friday, March 27, 2009
G--20 to Mess with Accounting Standards?
Bankers hate fair value and are receiving more support from U.S. and international lawmakers, who say financial instruments that are held to maturity should be allowed to be valued without reference to current market prices.
The U.S. Congress last week pressured the FASB to fast track a proposal that would provide added guidance on fair value requirements to generally give the banks what they want. The comment period for the IASB/FASB proposal ends on April 1, after being out for an unusually short 15-day period. The comment period on the IASB's proposal is 30 days.
In addition to the fair value rules, banks also want action on reserve rules. Banks are limited in what they can lend based on their asset and equity positions. Lawmakers may want to change these rules to loosen up lending practices. Banks and lawmakers blame the current credit crisis on mark to market and bank reserve rules. International rules on the current regulatory capital ratios for banks were set up in the Basel II agreement.
Different ideas exist on this:
- IASB chairman David Tweedie has suggested using the insurance company model of catastrophic reserves, i.e. banks would establish a non-distributable reserve on the balance sheet, i.e. not on the income statement. The balance sheet asset would be clearly marked as being non-distributable so investors understood its purpose. If catastrophe hit — such as a credit crisis — the company would be allowed to tap the reserve to keep the event from decimating company earnings.
- Other experts have suggested using what is known as dynamic provisioning, a reserve technique used by banks in Spain. In this case, reserves are increased during good times so they can be drawn down when losses pile up. Dynamic provisioning, also referred to as the "cookie jar" method, smoothes earnings when cash is released from the reserve and fed through the profit and loss statement. However, some companies have used earnings smoothing to manage and inflate earnings, as the release of reserves can be masked on financial statements.
- A third method, involving two net income lines, has also been discussed. The concept here is to create a second line representing regulatory net income to show a company's profit minus its capital reserve. Along with separating the cash reserve from the earnings calculation, a company could use this line to calculate performance-based executive compensation. In that way, executives would not be getting rich off of inflated profit numbers.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Arthur Levitt: FASB Caved in to Banks and Political Pressure
Such a subjective judgment is bound to decrease investor confidence in reported income.
The real scandal here is not the decision by the FASB, rather it is how the independence of regulators and standard-setters is being threatened. This isn't just about the income statements of banks. It's about further eroding investor confidence, precisely at a moment when investors are practically screaming for more protection.
In seeking to protect its independence, the FASB has surrendered some of it in the bargain.
Independence from public pressure has a value, and when you give some of it away, you've lost something that takes years to rebuild.
The FASB should rethink its approach to these rules.
Investors once believed that U.S. markets were sufficiently protected from political pressure and manipulation by a system of interlocking independent agencies and rule-making bodies -- some government-run, some not. That system is being dismantled, piece by piece, by political jawboning and rushed rule rewrites. Now, investors find themselves with fewer protections and weakened.
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Investors vs. Bankers--Who will Win?
Opposition comes from such places as the Consumer Federation of America, the CFA Institute and the FASB's Investors Technical Advisory Committee. The opposition may also have an impact on proposed changes to financial institutions' regulatory capital levels, which the banks claim are needed to ease the existing credit crunch and to avoid future credit messes like we have had in the past year.
Banks have claimed for years that mark-to-market rules force them to place unrealistically low values on illiquid or otherwise difficult to trade assets (known in mark-to-market accounting terms as "Level 3 Financial Instruments".)
The FASB/IASB proposals require "significant judgment" on the part of management in determining when a market isn't active. Once determined inactive, it would effectively allow management to ignore trading prices when coming up with a value for a security.
Those who have recently voiced opposition to the proposed rules say that they make it too easy for companies to reduce write-offs on impaired assets and make it easier for banks to keep their regulatory capital at unrealistic levels, allowing unstable financial institutions to make bad credit choices.
Mark-to-market accounting is under increasingly fierce attack by bankers who are lobbying hard for U.S. Congress to suspend or repeal mark to market rules. Bankers blame the rules for the current financial crisis.
Those who oppose the rules are against the banking industry's ability to make the statutory and regulatory regime work in their favour. They claim that the banks want accounting rules to change to fix irresponsible banking activity. While they agree that mark to market rules are not perfect, they do provide transparency in valuing assets and that such transparency helps investors.
Monday, January 19, 2009
Fair Value, IFRS and Obama
Paul Volcker is the Chair of Obama’s financial advisory team and Chairman of the Trustees of the "Group of Thirty". Recently the Group of Thirty Working Group on Financial Reform published Financial Reform A Framework for Financial Stability. Volcker alsonhas an important history, as Chair of the U.S. Fed and as Chair of the IASB's oversight organization. he is thought to be a propornent of IFRS in the U.S. Below are a few comments by Volcker and an excerpt from the Fair Value section of the report. Fair Value was important enough to comprise one of 17 recommendations in the report.Quotes from Chariman Volcker:
"The issue posed by the present crisis is crystal clear: How can we restore strong, competitive, innovative financial markets to support global economic growth without once again risking a breakdown in market functioning so severe as to put the world economies at risk? We hope that our proposals, which explicitly relate to the weaknesses that have become evident in the financial system over the last year, will be a useful contribution to the debate about needed reforms both by private financial institutions and by public authorities."
"The pervasive and deep-rooted financial crisis has amply demonstrated that our financial system is broken and it requires thorough-going repair,"
There were no representatives from the accounting community on the group that authored the report.
Excerpt from: FINANCIAL REFORM A Framework for Financial Stability
Fair Value Accounting
Recommendation 12:
a. Fair value accounting principles and standards should be reevaluated with a view to developing more realistic guidelines for dealing with less liquid instruments and distressed markets.
b. The tension between the business purpose served by regulated financial institutions that intermediate credit and liquidity risk and the interests of investors and creditors should be resolved by development of principles-based standards that better reflect the business model of these institutions, apply appropriate rigor to valuation and evaluation of intent, and require improved disclosure and transparency. These standards should also be reviewed by, and coordinated with, prudential regulators to ensure application in a fashion consistent with safe and sound operation of such institutions.
c. Accounting principles should also be made more flexible in regard to the prudential need for regulated institutions to maintain adequate credit loss reserves sufficient to cover expected losses across their portfolios over the life of assets in those portfolios. There should be full transparency of the manner in which reserves are determined and allocated.
d. As emphasized in the third report of the CRMPG, under any and all standards of accounting and under any and all market conditions, individual financial institutions must ensure that wholly adequate resources, insulated by fail-safe independent decision- making authority, are at the center of the valuation and price verification process.
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
SEC/FASB Fair Value and Impairment Changes
"There's still time to comment on the FASB's rapid-transit amendment of the impairment model embodied in EITF Issue No. 99-20. To put it in a nutshell: the existing rules will require companies having a decline in value for things like lower-rated securitizations, whether held by issuers as a retained interest or purchased outright, to look at the cash flows a marketplace participant would use in evaluating the cash flows of the instrument. The impairment charge can then be determined. The FASB would like to replace that test with a more judgment-based model embodied in Statement 115, at the request of the SEC. "
"Is it an improvement? I don't believe it is; in fact, I think it would be quite likely for impairments on securities covered by the amendment to be recognized later rather than sooner. Sure, the banks would like that - but I don't think that's giving investors timely or realistic information for investing decisions. I've put together my own comment letter, appearing below. I would recommend that even if you can send just a brief email on the subject to the FASB email-box, you should do so. Avoiding a reckoning on the values of these instruments is not the same thing as a reckoning; you'll be doing yourself a favor in the long run if firms are reporting their troubles honestly in the present. "
December 28, 2008
Russell G. Golden
FASB Technical Director
Financial Accounting Standards Board
P.O. Box 5116
Norwalk, Connecticut 06856-5116
Re: Proposed FSP EITF 99-20-a
Dear Mr. Golden:
I am writing in regard to the Proposed FSP EITF 99-20-a, “Amendments to the Impairment and Interest Income Measurement Guidance of EITF Issue No. 99-20.” I do not support the issuance of this amendment for the following reasons.
• The existing No. 99-20 impairment model embodies marketplace participant points of view in determining whether or not an impairment exists. The model is consistent with the principles of FASB’s Concept Statement No. 7, “Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements,” and also with those contained in Statement No. 157, “Fair Value Measurements.” The information it provides investors is a faithful representation of current economic values. The impairment model embodied in Statement 115 is far less prescriptive and invokes much more preparer judgment.
This project originated because the banking industry lobbied the SEC for more lenient rules on recognizing losses on some of the worst-faring securities created during the housing boom. Moving to a Statement 115 model will not provide better information to investors than the current impairment model, and in fact, could lead to delayed recognition of impairments.
At a time when the American auditor is facing some of its most serious professional challenges since the early part of this decade, the FASB will hobble them in their dealings with clients by replacing an impairment model that currently works with one that leaves plenty of room for management discretion. Ordinarily, that wouldn’t be necessarily wrong - but given the current economic environment and the genesis of this project, it certainly portends a negative outcome regarding the information to be provided to investors.
• I believe the Board has its priorities reversed on this project. If a Level C standard (No. 99-20) produces information more consistently representative of fair values than the Level A standard (Statement 115), then it would seem that there is a problem with Statement 115.
If fair value reporting provides investors with the information they need to make investment decisions, then why should the Board engage in projects that decrease the information provided to investors?
Instead of diluting the information provided to investors by Issue No. 99-20, the Board would do better by investors - whom it is ostensibly serving, rather than preparers - to study the shortcomings of Statement 115. In fact, the whole idea of “other than temporary impairments” should be reconsidered through the expansion of fair value accounting for financial instruments. If full fair value accounting for financial instruments existed, there would be no need for artificial categorizations like “held-to-maturity” and “available-for-sale” securities - and no need for other-than-temporary impairment testing.
• The Board has engaged in a mere facade of a due process. An 11-day comment period for a project with this much potential reporting impact like this one is a mere sham.
Take into account the religious and national holidays during those eleven days and this amendment’s due process takes on the trappings of a parody.
At least the Board went through the motions of a due process, unlike the IASCF and the IASB when they amended IAS 39 last October.
In closing, I would like to support the Board in simplifying the accounting literature in trying to remove multiple impairment models and other possible redundancies in the accounting literature. There is that minor benefit to this project, but at too great a cost to investors.
I would support that notion, however, only if the actions taken were more comprehensive and not on a piecemeal basis that serve to benefit one group at the expense of investors.
That concludes my comments. If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact me. Best regards.
Sincerely,
Jack Ciesielski
From the Analyst's Accounting Observer
Monday, January 5, 2009
In Depth Analysis of SEC Report on Fair Value
SEC to Critics: Back Away
In a Congressionally-mandated report issued this week, the SEC found that fair value accounting was not the cause of the ongoing financial crisis, and that neither FAS 157, nor mark-to-market accounting, should be suspended or fundamentally changed. In addition, the Commission found that:
- Though imperfect, FAS 157 and fair value disclosures provide timely, valuable information to investors, and market confidence would be hindered should either be suspended.
- Fair value accounting was not a major cause of the financial institution failures; instead, high credit losses and dramatic increases in depositor outflows (so-called "runs on the bank") were the main drivers. Indeed, fair value proved to be a good signal of the decaying asset bases of these institutions.
- Accounting standards are properly focused on the needs of the investor. Regulatory capital, while important, neither is nor should be a significant consideration of US GAAP principles-and concerns that fair valued regulatory capital requirements requires ‘deleveraging,' and is thus pro-cyclical, should be addressed to bank regulators, not accounting standard-setters.
- Improvements can be made to FAS 157, particularly around additional guidance for illiquid markets, distinctions between credit and liquidity losses, the use of managerial judgment, and a much more simplified impairment framework.
Fair Value: Reflecting, Not Causing, A Very Bad Year
While the overall fair value of financial institution assets declined in 2008, the SEC found that this was caused by the general economic downturn, and increases in credit losses and high default rates, not fair value requirements themselves.
Approximately 45% of financial institution assets are measured at fair value, of which three-quarters were held at level 2, 15% at level 1, and only 9% at level 3, the so-called "mark-to-model" tier. This distribution has held fairly constant over the course of 2008.
For a more extensive analysis of these asset classes, please see the Roundtable's brief on the subject.
Critically, though, asset impairment charges have grown significantly between 2007 and 2008-in 2007, impairment charges totaled around 1% of equity, while in the first three quarters of 2008, those charges had jumped to 8% of equity-a change that many have blamed on the requirement to fair value these assets (as opposed to holding at historical cost, where those impairments could perhaps have been minimized or pushed off).
However, the SEC found that:
"While fair value is used to measure certain assets such as trading securities and impairment losses on AFS securities, such declines in value were directionally consistent with the losses on the underlying loans and the current economic conditions, which impacted the value of these securities."
Case In Point: Bank Failures
Focusing on the most public example of the financial crisis, failed banks and financial institutions, the SEC found that "fair value accounting was not a primary underlying cause," instead; abnormally high default rates and credit losses, a decline in the overall quality of the asset base, and the resulting dramatic increases in "runs on the bank" were the main problem.
Looking at banks that failed over 2008 (and focusing on Washington Mutual, IndyMac, and Downey Saving and Loan, the three biggest failures), the SEC found:
- Most loans were accounted for on an amortized-cost basis, not a fair value basis, and so would not be impacted by FAS 157 requirements.
- The banks that failed (most notably IndyMac) did so because they focused heavily in mortgage-backed securities which both had more concentrated credit risks and losses, and unexpectedly high default rates.
- As a group, failed banks had non-performing loans that "greatly exceeded the levels experienced generally for non-failed banks of similar sizes."
- The decline in regulatory capital which ultimately crippled most failed banks was thus a result of the deterioration in bank's underlying asset base-caused mainly by credit losses, and exacerbated by increases in depositor outflows. Fair value may have reflected the lower quality assets (and, the SEC speculates, may have served as an early warning, especially if fair value had been more extensively used), but it did not cause the failures.
Ultimately, the 2008 bank crises were similar to most other historic bank failures-caused by poor business decisions, unexpectedly high credit losses, and finally, "runs on the bank" that the institutions could not survive. The instruments may have been different in this case-but the mechanisms were not.
Investors: Fair Value Is a Useful Indicator-Don't Change It
Through a series of forums and comment letters, the SEC solicited a broad range of input on fair value-and with few exceptions, most investors and preparers support fair value generally (and FAS 157 specifically) as a useful tool, and feel that suspension would decrease overall investor confidence. A few included comments, called representative by the SEC, were:
"Fair value accounting with robust disclosures provides more reliable, timely, and comparable information than amounts that would be reported under other alternative accounting approaches."
[Joint Letter: Center for Audit Quality, CFA Institute, Consumer Federation of America, Council of Institutional Investors, Investment Management Association]
"We do not believe that fair value accounting was the cause or even a contributing factor to the current credit crisis. Fair value accounting did not create the losses, but rather reflected the market conditions by initially bringing to light the impact of poor lending practices and the resulting effect on the current lack of liquidity and overall crisis in the financial markets. Fair value accounting reflects the effects of a transaction on an entity's financial statements. It does not, however, drive the underlying economic activity."
[Credit Suisse Group]
Criticisms of fair value were mainly two fold. One group criticized the implications of fair value, mainly on regulatory capital, and here the SEC's basic response was that regulatory capital was a separate issue not really related to (nor appropriately governed by) GAAP rules.
The second criticism was on the application of fair value – mainly its role in illiquid or depressed markets. Here commentators agreed that more judgment and clarification would be helpful, and the SEC points to a series of coordinated guidance issued by the major standard-setters in late September, where they stressed that market values were not intended to be the sole determination of fair value in illiquid markets, and that other criteria could, and should, be incorporated into measurements.
Overall, the preparer and investor communities support fair value, and while they believe that modifications may be needed, they neither request nor desire systemic change.
What Should the SEC Do Next?
As required by Congress, the SEC considered (and broadly rejected) a series of possible alternatives to fair value standards:
- Suspend FAS 157: While the SEC has the legislative power to suspend FAS 157, they spoke out against this step, noting that FAS 157 does not require fair value, it merely consistently defines the term, and that a suspension would lead to inconsistent definitions, disclosures, and guidance. Instead, the SEC called for more clarification of FAS 157, calling for increased guidance to ensure that their truly is a single consistent measurement framework.
- Modify Fair Value (e.g. return to historical cost): The SEC argues that fair value has generally proven to be helpful to investors, and that other methodologies have their own set of unique comparability problems (such as how historical cost can assign identical assets different values based on different purchase prices).
- Reduce Volatility through a "Rolling Average": Proponents of a "rolling average" argue that by spreading the value over a longer period of time (rather than a single point value), volatility would be reduced. However, the SEC argues that this would only lead to a debate about the proper time period for the rolling average, as well as shifting towards more prescriptive rules when the standard-setters are already committed towards a more principles-based approach.
The SEC did issue a series of tactical, and unsurprising, recommendations, including:
- FAS 157 and other fair value/mark-to-market requirements should be improved (mainly through additional guidance and disclosure) but not suspended. Fair value was not the cause of the financial crisis, and it serves as a valuable tool for investors.
- Additional measures should be taken to improve the applicability of existing fair value standards. Standard-setters need to issue more guidance around inactive, illiquid, and distressed markets, as well as promote education and training around fair value for preparers and investors.
- Readdress financial asset impairment frameworks. There are too many asset impairment frameworks, and they are not compatible with one-another, leading to significant comparability issues. A single, global model should be developed.
- Improve guidance around managerial judgment. Fair value, especially around level two and three assets and liabilities, inherently requires preparer judgment. Guidance should be issued about how to evaluate the reasonableness of accounting judgment.
- Accounting standards should continue to meet the needs of investors. Regulatory capital is important-but it's not the job of accounting standard-setters.
- Establish additional formal measures to address the operation of existing accounting standards. Implement post-adoption review processes and formal policies for situations requiring near-immediate responses. The ad hoc standard-setter responses of late September should not become the norm.
- Simplify the accounting for investing in financial assets. The IASB and FASB should work to create a single, simpler, standard.
Conclusions: Nothing Surprising
The SEC's report is not surprising, and is completely consistent with their policies and statements over the last four months. Fair value, and FAS 157, will remain US accounting policy, and while they may (and probably should) be modified on the margins, the core principles will probably survive the financial crisis intact.
Monday, October 27, 2008
Don’t Blame Accounting
Mark to market is a business rarity - an accounting term that draws reactions from people who don't know spreadsheets from bedsheets. Mark to market, which we'll call MTM, evokes images of Enron's made-up profits and the other corporate scandals that marred the first years of this decade. Not pretty.
Now MTM - which means valuing marketable securities at market prices - is a hot item again, but for the opposite reason. This time financial companies and their allies are claiming it's too strict. They argue that marking the value of complex, illiquid securities to artificially low market prices has unnecessarily crippled the U.S. and world financial systems by creating billions of illusory losses on perfectly fine (albeit illiquid) securities, such as collateralized debt obligations linked to mortgages. Markets for these things, the argument goes, are depressed way below true economic value.
Accountants argue that MTM - known formally as Financial Accounting Standard 157 - is fine, although the Financial Accounting Standards Board has agreed to tweak it some. (Don't ask me for details - the written arguments on this are so sleep-inducing they could be marketed as an Ambien alternative.)
This week, the Securities and Exchange Commission is scheduled to hold a high-profile public meeting about MTM. The SEC, which has the power to overrule FASB, is holding the meeting because Section 133 of the $700 billion bailout bill requires that it study MTM and report to Congress by late December.
The guy who got 133 into the bill, Representative Spencer Bachus (R-Alabama), the ranking minority member of the House Banking Committee, told me he wasn't trying to politicize accounting. "It just says, 'Study it,'" he told me. "It doesn't say [to do] a study to repeal it. It doesn't say [to do] a study to suspend it."
But given that it's finger-pointing time both in Washington and on Wall Street, it's not going to be easy for the SEC to leave mark to market strictly alone. In this environment what regulator dares run the risk of being held responsible for not doing something that would supposedly mitigate the world's credit crunch? Would you want to find yourself accused of failing to act if the financial world totally melted down, as it has occasionally seemed about to do?
Normal accounting is being overridden to help banks in various ways. In early October, for instance, federal financial regulators jointly ruled that the $125 billion of preferred stock the Treasury is buying from nine big banks will be treated as tier-one capital (the best kind), even though it normally wouldn't qualify.
Second, in a little-noted move, regulators allowed banks with losses on some Fannie Mae (FNM, Fortune 500) and Freddie Mac (FRE, Fortune 500) securities to treat the resulting tax savings as tier one in their regulatory statements for the third quarter. That's strange, given that the fourth quarter ended Sept. 30, as usual, but legislation making this tax break usable didn't become law until Oct. 3. How often has my source for this nugget - accounting guru Robert Willens of Robert Willens LLC - seen such grandfathering in his 40-year career? "Never," he says.
Of course, this is more about optics than economics. As is mark to market, in my humble opinion. Credit markets have been frozen much of the past 15 months largely because banks haven't trusted the balance sheets of other banks and have thus been afraid to lend to them. I can't imagine that confidence problem being resolved by changing MTM.
There are problems with MTM: It's relatively new, and parts of it seem arbitrary. But its problems have been exaggerated. It's easier to blame accountants for your problems than to admit you made your institution vulnerable by overleveraging its balance sheet and buying securities you didn't understand. Ironically, many of today's whiners adopted MTM a year before they had to, partly because of an arcane provision that let them count as profit the decline in the market value of their publicly traded debt.
The bottom line: Despite MTM's flaws, blaming it for the world's financial problems isn't the answer. Neither is shooting the messenger - or, in this case, the accountant.
By Allan Sloan, senior editor at large, Fortune Magazine
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
The Bankers’ Case Against Fair Value--Going Back 20Years
The Bankers’ case goes back a long way--at least as far as 1999 (and further) with the release of this comment letter, back when the the FASB first began to advance the case for greater fair value use in determining the income of financial institutions. Portions of their case from that letter (remember this is from 1999):
- Users of bank financial statements do not support the proposed change to full fair value accounting. This is because a full fair value system does not provide a sound basis for predicting banking book net cash flows and lacks relevance.
- Banking book income is earned on an ongoing basis over time and not from taking advantage of short term fluctuations in prices; the accruals accounting method provides a dynamic and faithful representation of both this earning process and the manner in which a bank’s management operates. It, therefore, provides a more relevant and reliable representation of this earning process. A notional fair value snapshot taken at a historic balance sheet date fails to achieve this.
- The reality is that fair values for a banking operation are significantly more subjective than values derived under the mixed measurement accounting model and this would reduce both the reliability and comparability of financial statements.
- Within any given accounting measurement model, it is not possible to encapsulate in a single measure everything that an investor needs to know. Both fair value and historical cost accounting need to be supplemented by appropriate risk-based and other disclosures in order to provide investors with a complete picture.
The Bankers' points in other older comment letters are eerily relevant to today’s dilemma: "Notwithstanding the development of securitization techniques and credit derivatives, it remains the case that customer loans are generally held to maturity by banks without variation of the original contractual terms of the loan. Accounting for these loans on an historical cost basis, therefore, most closely reflects the economic substance and cash flows, namely, that income is earned over the period of the loan. The bank is exposed to risk on the non-repayment of the principal advanced. "
"It has been argued that the fair value of a customer loan provides relevant information about the current credit quality of that loan; as a borrower’s credit standing deteriorates, the credit spread demanded rises and therefore the fair value falls and a loss occurs. However, this loss is theoretical because the widening of the spread neither has an impact on the existing loan contract nor on the ultimate repayment of the loan in the majority of cases. "
We do not support the FASB's move toward fair value accounting. This will have a significant impact on all industries and will significantly impair the comparability of financial statements. The indication on the FASB's website that the IASB " believes that the fair value option will enable constituents to become more familiar with using fair value as a measurement attribute for financial instruments" is frightening. Experimental accounting, without sufficient study, should not be used for financial reporting measurement purposes, particularly because it can have such a significant impact on an entire industry. If this is the goal, then the FASB and IASB should provide a discussion document for comment on fair value. This document would need sufficient study and consultation with industry and users prior to issuing a standard. Without sufficient study, this experiment could fail. The indication on the FASB's website that the IASB " believes that the fair value option will enable constituents to become more familiar with using fair value as a measurement attribute for financial instruments" is frightening. Experimental accounting, without sufficient study, should not be used for financial reporting measurement purposes, particularly because it can have such a significant impact on an entire industry.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Wolves Circle Mark to Market
Critics of the proposed changes to the "mark to market" rules say gains created by easing the rules would be illusory and would delay resolving genuine doubts about the value of mortgage assets that has caused the recent crisis in confidence. As of Wednesday, the industry appeared to be gaining support for easing the rules, in part because some lawmakers believe it could cut the cost of a potential financial-industry bailout.
Banks and a diverse coalition of lawmakers scored a victory on the issue Tuesday, when the SEC and Financial Accounting Standards Board issued "clarification" to the mark-to-market accounting rules.
The SEC and FASB stopped short of bowing to pressure for a complete suspension of fair-value accounting. But that pressure could intensify when the rescue bill reaches a House vote. Financial-industry lobbyists' work on the financial-markets bill has given them another opportunity to press their case through allies in Congress, many of whom are big recipients of campaign money from the industry. More than 60 lawmakers -- all but five of whom voted against the bill Monday -- wrote to the SEC Wednesday, urging the regulator to immediately suspend the mark-to-market rule.
Accounting firms and investors groups put up a united front Wednesday in opposition to the changes. "Suspending fair value accounting during these challenging economic times would deprive investors of critical financial information when it is needed most," said the Council of Institutional Investors, Center for Audit Quality and CFA Institute in a joint statement. "It would not help solve our economic difficulties."
Republican presidential candidate John McCain, in a statement, praised the SEC clarification, saying, "There is serious concern that these accounting rules are worsening the credit crunch, making it difficult for small businesses to stay afloat and squeezing family budgets."
"We have all seen what can happen when institutions are allowed to mask huge losses in asset values," PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC Chairman Dennis Nally wrote in a letter to Congress. Suspending the rules, he said, could "plant the seeds for the next crisis."
That hasn't swayed fiscal conservatives in the House, who cite the need to suspend mark-to-market rules in explaining their opposition to the rescue bill. "One of the best reasons to fire [SEC Chairman] Chris Cox is the refusal to deal with the problem of mark to market," Rep. Darrell Issa (R., Calif.) said on MSNBC this week. "You do that, and you put trillions of dollars back into the lending pool. ... It's a tool that's available [to] the SEC, the Fed, the FDIC and the Treasury secretary, and they're not using it."
Is Debate Over Mark-to-Market Just a Waste of Time?
In an excellent post on the Curious Capitalist blog, Justin Fox makes a point that may make the whole debate moot. “Investors and regulators and reporters and corporate executives need to learn not to take any financial reporting numbers, whether marked-to-market or not, at face value. The health of a bank or any corporation can never be adequately measured by a single bottom-line number. Understanding the assumptions and uncertainties inherent in accounting numbers is crucial to understanding how to use them,” he writes.
In the current environment, everyone seems to be taking Fox’s advice. That may be one reason why these markets are frozen in the first place. Even if mark-to-market rules are suspended immediately, it won’t change the makeup of a company’s balance sheet. Investors have decided that these assets are toxic and no matter how a bank accounts for them in its books, that sentiment isn’t likely to change unless investors see some proof that the instruments are actually undervalued. So far, there’s been little to suggest otherwise.
Steve Forbes: Ease Mark-to-Market Rules
Famed business magazine publisher Steve Forbes says there's a relatively simple way to help solve the financial mess on Wall Street — ease mark-to-market accounting rules. "Short-term assets should not be given arbitrary values unless there are actual losses. The mark-to-market mania of regulators and accountants is utterly destructive. It is like fighting a fire with gasoline," Forbes wrote in the Oct. 6 issue of Forbes magazine.
Forbes recommends that investors think of the mark-to-market mess by using the following metaphor: A person buys a house for $250,000 and then takes out a $250,000 fixed-rate mortgage for 30 years. The person's income is adequate to make the monthly payments. "But under mark-to-market rules, the bank could call up and say that if your house is not sold immediately, it would fetch maybe $200,000 in such a distressed sale. The bank would then tell you that you owe $250,000 on a house worth only $200,000 and to please fork over the $50,000 immediately or else lose the house," said Forbes.
"Absurd? Obviously. But that's what, in effect, is happening today. Thus, institutions with long-term assets are having to drastically reprise them downward. And so the crisis feeds on itself."
Making the case for mark-to-market rules
There's a segment of the political and banking world that wants to toss out mark-to-market accounting rules, on the logic that they create those nasty, inconvenient writedowns. There's a growing constituency telling regulators and politicians to leave mark-to-market accounting rules just as they are, thank you very much.
There is no debate over the real financial pain that can result when the value of a illiquid, complex security has to be pegged in a market plagued by unprecedented chaos. But the alternative to pain is denial, or worse.
Trust me accounting – allowing banks and other financial players flexibility in setting the values of securities they hold - isn't likely to solve the credit crunch. It's just going to make it worse. It creates an enviorment rife with uncertainty, and open to fraud.
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Accounting Mayhem at the Wall Street Journal
Mark to Mayhem?
Because of all this, the regulatory state finds itself in a somewhat absurd position -- its own rules could render many financial institutions insolvent in a manner inconvenient to the state.
We choose the adjective advisedly. These institutions are guaranteed by the federal government, implicitly or explicitly, so questions of solvency are largely academic--except as to the value of their equity. In fact, much of the ferocious argument over mark-to-market really is a political battle between CEOs and short sellers for control of the stock price. Washington wishes they'd just shut up before savers and lenders join the argument -- because, in present circumstances, we'd call that a "bank run."
But usefulness is not what we're talking about here -- we're talking about a regulatory trap for equity, created as an unintended consequence of a well-meaning accounting rule. Short sellers see this trap and try to exploit it. Uninsured lenders and depositors see it and worry about not getting paid back. That fear is why banks have all but stopped lending to each other -- and why Henry Paulson launched his plan, and why the SEC made its move yesterday.
Accounting straddles the real and unreal, so it's hard to guess how much difference getting rid of mark-to-market might really make. The only way to find out is to try.
A mere accounting rule change won't reduce foreclosures or raise home prices -- then again, if spared drastic writedowns, banks might be more willing to lend, raising home prices and reducing foreclosures.
A mere accounting rule can't alter the underlying economics of a lending business -- then again, no longer worried about insolvency-by-accountant, investors might discover new confidence to inject capital and improve the underlying economics of a lending business.
No accounting rule is worth $700 billion. Then again, the essence of the Paulson plan was to raise the value of bank assets to help banks escape the regulatory equity trap. Does that mean we can change an accounting rule and save Congress from having to appropriate $700 billion?
Other views—
In the mainstream media
The accounting rule you should care about
A New Rule Change That Could Hurt Taxpayers
Why get a bailout when you can massage the books?
Clarification of accounting rule sparks debate
In blogs
Moving The Foul Pole: The Mark-To-Market Scandal
Changing the rules on bank accounting, the fix is in
Fair Value Follies
Fair Value Follies 2
FASB and SEC Make Nice-Nice
SEC: Why Don't You Just Tell Us What You Want The Value To Be?
SEC, FASB Clarify Fair Value Accounting
This seems like just plain common sense and a standard application of the rules. But it serves the purpose of starting the process of reconciling GAAP to the recently expressed views of investment bankers and politicians.
Excerpts:
Can management's internal assumptions (e.g., expected cash flows) be used to measure fair value when relevant market evidence does not exist?
Yes.
How should the use of "market" quotes (e.g., broker quotes or information from a pricing service) be considered when assessing the mix of information available to measure fair value?
Broker quotes may be an input when measuring fair value, but are not necessarily determinative if an active market does not exist for the security.
Are transactions that are determined to be disorderly representative of fair value? When is a distressed (disorderly) sale indicative of fair value?
The results of disorderly transactions are not determinative when measuring fair value.
Can transactions in an inactive market affect fair value measurements?
Yes.
What factors should be considered in determining whether an investment is other-than-temporarily impaired?
In general, the greater the decline in value, the greater the period of time until anticipated recovery, and the longer the period of time that a decline has existed, the greater the level of evidence necessary to reach a conclusion that an other-than-temporary decline has not occurred.
Commentary:
S.E.C. Move May Relax Asset Rule
How to Start the Healing Now
Financial crisis: SEC cheers finance companies with mark-to-market ...
Focus turns to 'mark to market' accounting rules
Understanding the Significance of Mark-to-Market Accounting
Stop Treating Wall Streeters Like Villains and Resolve This Crisis
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Thirsty for Changes to Mark to Market?
Kevin Kersten at bloggingstocks provides this amusing example:
Let me give a silly but simple illustration. If you have 20 one dollar bills in your wallet, we would all agree you have a net worth of $20. Thirsty Bob also has one dollar bill in his wallet and walks into the break room and wants to buy a Coke. Soda in the machine costs 50 cents, but it only takes quarters. Thirsty Bob asks if anyone has change and they all say no. Sam says he has only two quarters and will trade Thirsty Bob -- who is really thirsty -- two quarters for a dollar. Thirsty Bob quickly agrees to take Sam up one his offer in order to get the Coke now. Bob knows that two quarters for a dollar is a bad deal, but he is takes the deal anyway.
According to mark-to-market accounting, you, with your 20 dollar bills, now have a net worth of $10. Even though you are still holding the exact same 20 one dollar bills you held in your hand when you entered the room and even though you did not trade with anyone else in the room, the current public market in the room for $1 bills is 50 cents. If each of those $1 bills is worth two quarters, your net worth is only 40 quarters, or $10. You must evaluate your net worth based on the current market. You are smart enough to know that the one dollar bills are really worth four quarters at the bank down the road, but mark-to-market accounting will not allow you to use this "long term" evaluation method.
This, in essence, captures the problem of the current loans crisis. One dollar bills are the mortgages nobody is willing to buy. Banks must evaluate them at the depressed rates they occasionally trade at and everyone is feeling poorer.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Mark to Market Accounting Consequences of Bailout Explained
Also, in a reaction to the financial crisis, the International Accounting Standards Board has called a special meeting to discuss the IFRS rules on accounting for financial instruments, which is where the fair value and mark to market accounting rules exist.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Paulson/Bernanke: Need Bright People to Figure Value of Mortgage Assets
Sudeep Reddy at WSJ
Ben Bernanke argues for not buying assets at fire-sale prices in the Treasury’s $700 billion bailout. Uncertainty in housing markets and the economy are forcing financial institutions to mark mortgage securities at fire-sale prices, rather than their value if held to maturity, effectively creating a vicious circle of more write-downs that further depress asset values, Mr. Bernanke explained. Bernanke essentially argued that fire-sale prices would hurt markets even further and wouldn’t solve the problem facing the economy. “We cannot impose punitive measures on institutions that choose to sell assets.” Still, he acknowledged that the precise approach to doing so hadn’t been determined, arguing for flexibility. “We do not know exactly what the best design is,” and that would come from consultation with experts, Mr. Bernanke said. Bernanke distinguished between, on the one hand, “fire sale prices,” the ones that prevail “when you sell into an illiquid market” and, on the other, the prices that holders think the assets are really worth, sometimes described as “fundamental” values or “hold-to-maturity” value. “The holders have a view of what they think it’s worth. It’s hard for outsiders to know,” Mr. Bernanke said. The point of an auction is to reveal those prices. “If you have an appropriate auction mechanism… what you’ll do is restart this market,” he added.
Paulson, while seeking maximum flexibility, said the Treasury is considering doing auctions one asset class at a time. He said they aim to bring “bright people” to work on the challenge of designing market mechanisms.