Wednesday, August 5, 2009

Trains that Ran Ahead of Time: GE Takes Big Reputation Hit and pays SEC Fines

General Electric broke accounting rules to meet or beat earnings expectations
SEC claims they intentionally defrauded investors

GE has paid $250-million in fines and legal costs to settle a claim by the SEC that they intentionally defrauded investors.

The SEC fined GE $50-milion and lawyers and accountants advising General Electric on the fraud settlement earned $200-million on “external legal and accounting expenses” from the case.

The SEC slammed GE for almost ten years of earnings manipulation through accounting practices. GE consistently beat analyst consensus estimates by a few cents a share in nearly every quarter.

The SEC stated that “high-level GE accounting executives or other finance personnel approved accounting that was not in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

"GE bent the accounting rules beyond the breaking point," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Overly aggressive accounting can distort a company's true financial condition and mislead investors."

David P. Bergers, Director of the SEC's Boston Regional Office, added, "Every accounting decision at a company should be driven by a desire to get it right, not to achieve a particular business objective. GE misapplied the accounting rules to cast its financial results in a better light."

There is always a risk that companies that take pride in consistently being slightly above market or analyst predications are not unlike Bernie Madoff’s fraudulently consistent positive returns on his portfolio over a long periods. GE has been in that slightly better than expected position for years and the SEC, to its credit, hit them hard for diddling with the quarterly earnings amounts.

Some of the years in question were presided over by Jack Welch, some by Jeffrey Immelt. The reputation of those leaders and GE takes a serious setback with the SEC’s actions.

The SEC found the accounting irregularities through a risk-based investigation of GE’s accounting. Their first clue was wrong hedge accounting, and the case developed from there to full blown fraud investigation.

The SEC plowed through millions of emails. Some of the smoking guns found by the SEC included the following statements:

  • “How do we intend to deal with the SEC “one strike and you’re out” position? Doesn’t this mean that potentially we can no longer qualify for cash flow hedging??? Urgent that you find disclosures of others who have had cash flow failures. Isn’t this an extraordinarily big deal?”
  • “I just went back to the SEC speech on this point, and don’t see any flexibility whatsoever. We’ve got to fix this.”
  • “this was the one to go with until today . . . but when the initial quantification got finished today, it showed a $(200MM) or bigger hit would have to be considered”
  • “[auditors] . . . looking into this, and might struggle to agree with this”
  • a senior accountant in GE’s corporate accounting group sent a powerpoint describing GE’s outside auditor’s view that, if GE’s practice of recognizing margin on spare parts pursuant to RAM “Was Observed and Challenged [it is] . . .Virtually Assured We Would Lose.”
  • A document stated that...“accounting justification [was] crumbling” based on expected GAAP changes
  • A powerpoint presentation by a GE accountant implied that a change could be accomplished without having to make a disclosure. “$1 billion unexplained balance in GE’s [deferred charge balance] could draw the attention of the SEC and would not survive.”

The alleged misstatements:

  • improper application of the accounting standards to GE's commercial paper funding program to avoid unfavorable disclosures--estimated approximately $200 million pre-tax charge to earnings
  • sales of locomotives that had not yet occurred to accelerate more than $370 million in revenue
  • improper accounting for sales of commercial aircraft engines spare parts increasing earnings by $585 million.

GE neither admitted nor denied the allegations and said it had co-operated with the SEC and revised its financial statements. Civil suits may still be launched against some individuals.

The SEC’s complaint does not implicate either Welch or Immelt, or GE’s CFO.

Recently Immelt has ended earnings guidance for analysts. GE had an unexpected earnings miss in April last year, sending its stock into a pre-financial meltdown slump from a 2007 high of over $40 to about $26, before the intraday meltdown low of under $6.

FASB, IASB Support Moving to Direct Method For Cash Flow

As the FASB and IASB consider their proposed overhaul of financial statement presentation, one of the
significant changes would be the utilization of the direct method
rather than the indirect method for calculating cash flows.


The requirement to use the direct method is part of the proposed
changes that the two boards introduced in Discussion Paper (DP) No.
1630-100, Preliminary Views on Financial Statement Presentation.


The boards are planning to discuss the proposal in the near future, as
part of a broader discussion on financial statement presentation. In
this paper, the boards are advocating greater use of the direct method
of calculating operating cash flows.


Under the direct method, companies would present separately the main
categories of their operating cash receipts, such as cash collected
from customers, and operating cash payments, such as cash paid to
suppliers to acquire inventory. This approach is also known as the
income statement method because it requires companies to compute the
net cash provided by operating activities by adjusting each item in
the income statement.


Currently, most companies use what is known as the indirect method, by
reconciling profit or loss or net income to net operating cash flows.


Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS permit both the direct and indirect methods of
presenting operating cash flows. However, in DP No. 1630–100, the
boards said a major deficiency of the indirect method is that it
derives the net cash flow from operating activities without separately
presenting any of the operating cash receipts and payments.

Tuesday, August 4, 2009

SEC Comment Letters--In Your Mailbox Soon?

The accounting firm Crowe Horwath has published an article Recent Trends in SEC Comment Letters--Reproduced in its entirety below.

In December 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff indicated at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments that they would be conducting targeted reviews of fair value, other-than-temporary impairment (OTTI) of securities, and other asset impairments. As a result, several recent examples of SEC staff comment letters on periodic filings (Form 10-Qs and 10-Ks) have a clear focus on these issues.

Following are some general themes present in comment letters from the SEC staff on recent filings that might be helpful for registrants to consider as they prepare periodic filings. Management should carefully review their company's accounting policies as well as related financial statement and management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosures related to these issues.

Accounting
OTTI of Securities
The SEC has:

  • Asked registrants to justify why securities with fair values significantly below cost are not considered to be OTTI.
  • For securities with ratings of "default" or "speculative," the SEC has asked how management determined that an adverse change in cash flows had not occurred.
  • Challenged registrants on whether the losses for sales of securities after a period end should have been recognized in the prior period.
  • Asked registrants to provide specific information about securities with significant unrealized losses.
  • Requested information includes the specific issuer and name of each security; type of underlying collateral, credit rating, severity, and duration of the unrealized loss; and how the financial condition and near-term prospects of the issuer were considered when determining that no OTTI was present.


Securities/Other
The SEC has asked registrants to:

  • Provide implied discount rates used in determining fair value of securities when using Level 3 inputs (in accordance with the guidance in Financial Accounting Standards Board Staff Position 157-3 (FSP FAS 157-3), “Determining the Fair Value of a Financial Asset When the Market for That Asset Is Not Active,” and FSP FAS 157-4, “Determining Fair Value When the Volume and Level of Activity for the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and Identifying Transactions That Are Not Orderly”).
  • Reconcile the cash flows used to determine fair value with the cash flows used to assess OTTI.
    Indicate the systems and controls used to validate prices received from third parties when valuing securities.

Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
The SEC has commented on:

  • Implied control premiums used to determine fair value of reporting units for purposes of step one of goodwill impairment tests. Assumptions used to determine fair value must be supportable and should not contradict observable data about recent transactions.
  • The lack of support for a reasonable period in the context of determining market capitalization of a reporting unit.
  • The lack of support for assumptions used when determining the fair value of an intangible asset – for example, when a multiperiod earnings approach has been used.

Presentation and Disclosure

Loans and the Allowance for Loan Losses
The SEC has:

  • Asked registrants to consider more disaggregated disclosure about loan portfolios – for example, providing disclosures by exposure to subprime, alt A-paper, or other relatively high-risk loans.
  • Commented on disclosing reasons for changes (or lack thereof) in general loan reserves considering changes in credit risk.
  • Commented on presenting the basis for each risk category and the method for determining the loss factor applied to each category. It has asked companies to specifically identify how historical loss trends were adjusted based on current factors.
  • Asked registrants to explain reasons for directional inconsistencies in loan-loss allowances – for example, when impaired loans increased but specifically identified reserves decreased.

Securities
The SEC has requested:

  • More disclosure of reasons for transfers into and out of the Level 3 category and more robust discussion of how fair value was determined when classified as Level 3.
  • Support for securities being presented as Level 2 that appear to require Level 3 classification based on other disclosures.

www.crowehorwath.com